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ABSTRACT: Leaders understand the importance of training their
soldiers for rigorous combat assignments, but frequently misunderstand the importance of engaging in the resilience training activities
discussed in this article.

R

esilient soldiers, cohesive teams, and adaptable leaders serve
as the backbone of the human dimensions concept, enabling
effective performance in decentralized operations over
protracted periods of conflict.1 While there are many ways to build these
capabilities, including tough realistic training, soldiers can also be trained
in specific resilience skills that help them withstand and recover from
significant stress. Such training can yield surprising benefits; but with
competing requirements for units’ time, leaders want to be confident that
resilience training is worth the effort.
While evidence-based resilience training that has proven effective
with servicemembers is a wise investment, both financially and in
terms of human resources, even good, empirically validated resilience
training implemented half-heartedly and with mixed messages from
leadership is not worthwhile. When the unit environment undermines
the purpose of resilience training with a “check-the-block” mentality
or when the training is isolated from everyday military life, the training
loses potential value. And, despite its potential importance in helping
soldiers, resilience training is not a panacea: everyone has a point at
which bouncing back from stress is more difficult.

Resilience Training

Nevertheless, resilience skills training can help soldiers better
manage the psychological demands of military life and enhance the
readiness of all a unit’s members. Given each person’s background—
education, religion, socioeconomics, family, etc.—is different, each
person’s resilience is also different; thus, training needs likewise differ.
When unit training is provided, the training content will be novel for
some soldiers, but others may find the training redundant. So leaders
have a choice: build new skills for subgroups or approach resilience
training as a unit-based task similar to other traditional military training.
The benefit of focusing on groups who need specific training is that
at-risk soldiers may get more individualized attention while other soldiers
can focus on different tasks and can avoid unnecessary training. The
cost of this approach includes possibly stigmatizing and inadvertently
1 US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), The US Army Human Dimension
Concept, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-7 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2014).
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overlooking some at-risk soldiers as well as not optimally equipping
units to reinforce the lessons learned.
The advantage of a unit-based approach is the potential to leverage
members’ strengths, provide buddy support, and train junior leaders in
a common vocabulary of resilience and resilience skills to effectively
communicate with unit members. Still, to avoid boring the entire unit,
training has to be engaging and progressive over the career cycle of each
servicemember. Moreover, training has to be periodically refreshed. The
training approach depends both on organizational policy and on leaders’
choices—at all levels—to integrate resilience training in their units.
Numerous studies have attempted to disentangle the ingredients
of resilience. A review of the resilience literature in a RAND report
evaluated and summarized 270 studies.2 The researchers identified a set
of common resilience skills across the scientific literature and categorized
variables associated with individual resilience into five main factors:
(1) positive coping such as active problem-solving; (2) positive affect
such as optimism; (3) positive thinking such as thought restructuring
or changing one’s view of a problem; (4) realism such as having realistic
expectations and practicing acceptance; and (5) behavioral control such
as regulating one’s emotional response. Three additional factors were
identified for unit-level resilience: (1) positive command climate such as
leaders building pride for the mission and modeling good behaviors; (2)
teamwork such as work coordination, and (3) cohesion such as bonding.
Interestingly, these factors are consistent with human dimensions
concept components, which are typically incorporated into the Army’s
comprehensive resilience training programs.

Empirical Evidence

There appears to be evidence that resilience can indeed be taught,
but some studies show an effect while others do not and almost all of
the studies that do find an effect show small effects. In each of these
studies, resilience is measured in a different way, and while there is
no one agreed-upon metric of resilience, each study infers resilience
based on other measures such as fewer mental health symptoms, better
cognitive skills, and more effective work-related performance. The
studies that identify such effects find individuals—such as civilians,
police officers, and servicemembers—have better outcomes following
universal training designed to improve resilience-related skills.3
Several well-designed studies conducted with the Army highlight
ways in which resilience training has improved soldier outcomes on a
2 Lisa S. Meredith et al., Promoting Psychological Resilience in the U.S. Military (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, 2011).
3 Steven M. Brunwasser, Jane E. Gillham, and Eric S. Kim. “A Meta-Analytic Review of the Penn
Resiliency Program’s Effect on Depressive Symptoms,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 77,
no. 6 (December 2009): 1042–54, doi:10.1037/a0017671; Bengt B. Arnetz et al., “Assessment of a
Prevention Program for Work-Related Stress among Urban Police Officers,” International Archives
of Occupational and Environmental Health 86, no. 1 (January 2013): 79–88, doi:10.1007/s00420-0120748-6; Amy B. Adler et al., “Battlemind Debriefing and Battlemind Training as Early Interventions
with Soldiers Returning from Iraq: Randomization by Platoon,” Journal of Consulting and Clinical
Psychology 77, no. 5 (October 2009): 928–40, doi:10.1037/a0016877; Amy B. Adler et al., “Mental
Skills Training with Basic Combat Training Soldiers: A Group-Randomized Trial,” Journal of Applied
Psychology 100, no. 6 (May 2015): 1752–64, doi:10.1037/apl0000021; and Amishi P. Jha et al., “Minds
‘At Attention’: Mindfulness Training Curbs Attentional Lapses in Military Cohorts,” PLoS ONE 10,
no. 2 (February 2015): e0116889, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0116889.
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range of measures. In terms of foundational skills, a randomized trial of
2,432 soldiers going through basic combat training assigned platoons to
a resilience training condition or a military history condition. The study
found mental skills training such as goal setting, imagery, self-confidence,
attentional focus, and energy management improved performance on
obstacle courses, Army Physical Fitness Test diagnostic scores, and a
weapons qualification event.4 In one example, soldiers walked across a
high beam seven seconds faster if they had training in mental skills as
opposed to training in military history. Soldiers who participated in the
training also reported greater use of these important mental skills.5 The
skills central to this study are the same core performance psychology
skills used in the Army’s resilience training program.
In terms of skills promoting social resilience, a group randomized
trial was conducted with 1,138 soldiers in garrison in which Army
platoons were randomly assigned to social resilience training or a
comparison condition of cultural awareness training. Those units in the
social resilience condition that addressed social cognition, enhancing
connections, and resolving confl icts reported improved unit cohesion
after the training. Units in the other training condition did not report
similar outcomes.6 These resilience skills could be used to maintain
and improve unit connections in challenging contexts, such as Army
National Guard units returning from combat.
In terms of the deployment cycle, predeployment studies demonstrate
mindfulness—a type of resilience training in focused attention on
the present moment without elaboration or judgment—can enhance
soldiers’ functioning as measured by neurocognitive assessments of
working memory and attention.7 Thus, mindfulness training is now
being piloted as part of the Army’s resilience training program. Studies
also routinely find that when soldiers receive predeployment resilience
training focused on anticipating deployment stressors and identifying
cognitive restructuring skills that can be useful during deployment,
they report fewer post-traumatic stress disorder symptoms and physical
health symptoms as well as greater morale than soldiers who report
not receiving such training.8 Two randomized trials of nearly 4,000
soldiers after deployment show benefits of resilience training in terms
of reductions of post-traumatic stress, depression symptoms, and sleep
problems, as well as increases in life satisfaction.9 Such trainings are a
core part of the Army’s deployment cycle resilience training program.
Regarding the level of evidence presented in these studies, the gold
standard is a randomized trial because randomization typically addresses
preexisting group differences that might otherwise account for different
4 Adler, “Battlemind Debriefing,” 928–40.
5 Ibid.
6 John T. Cacioppo, “Building Social Resilience in Soldiers: A Double Dissociative Randomized
Controlled Study,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 109, no. 1 (July 2015): 90–105, doi:10.1037/
pspi0000022.
7 Ibid.
8 Eric S. McKibben et al., “Receipt and Rated Adequacy of Stress Management Training is
Related to PTSD and Other Outcomes among Operation Iraqi Freedom Veterans,” Military Psychology
21, no. 1 (January 2009): S68–81, doi:10.1080/08995600903249172.
9 Carl A. Castro et al., “Mental Health Training with Soldiers Four Months after Returning
from Iraq: Randomization by Platoon,” Journal of Traumatic Stress 25, no. 4 (August 2012): 376–83,
doi:10.1002/jts.21721. For more on the positive impact for soldiers with higher combat exposure,
see Adler, “Battlemind Debriefing,” 928–40.
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outcomes between two study conditions. If a randomized trial is not
feasible, a quasi-experimental design can suffice. In this kind of study,
individuals are not randomized to different groups but a handful of
preexisting groups are contrasted with one another. The difficulty with
this approach is that any differences found at follow-up may be due
to some other factor, such as a change in mission or leadership, that
affected one group and not the other. Statistical techniques can help
minimize this problem, but it is still a meaningful limitation.
Sometimes, an intervention can only be tested in a pre-post design.
In this situation, individuals being trained may be assessed prior to an
intervention and then again afterward. Unfortunately, in this design,
there is no way to know if effects are due to the intervention itself or
some extraneous factor.
Finally, case studies can be used to describe an individual or a
group response to an intervention. Typically, these studies involve an
individual attesting to the value of a particular intervention. While both
the pre-post design and case study are useful starting points, if a great
deal of resources are going to be assigned to roll-out an intervention, the
optimal way to determine if this investment in resources is worthwhile
is through a randomized trial.
The problem with research, admittedly, is that it is a slow process.
Scientists are also typically muted in their enthusiasm for any results they
do find because they are trained to identify weaknesses and limitations in
their studies. In addition, resilience training usually yields small effects
because it is typically provided as a public-health style or universal
intervention, implemented with a whole population, such as a brigade.
Despite these small effects, compared to interventions that target
specific populations, universal approaches likely yield better long-term
results.10 Basically, moving a large population a tiny amount can result
in more overall change than moving a handful of people a substantial
amount. This phenomenon occurs because treatment, even evidencebased and validated treatment, typically only attracts a small proportion
of people who need it, and of those who seek treatment, only a handful
stick with it. Furthermore, only a proportion of those who adhere to
the treatment regimen will actually benefit from the treatment. So,
the small improvements for more people associated with a universal
intervention can actually result in a more powerful improvement than
greater outcomes for fewer people affected by a targeted approach.

A Leader’s Perspective

In 2013, the commander of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment in Vilseck,
Germany, initiated an integrated resilience training program as part of
predeployment preparations for Afghanistan. Despite the premium on
leaders’ time, particularly at the company and platoon level, the regimental
commander recognized many programs across the installation could
support unit and individual readiness. Dubbed Dragoon Total Fitness,
this regimental initiative was a commander’s priority that integrated the
10 Douglas F. Zatzick, Thomas Koepsell, and Frederick P. Rivara, “Using Target Population
Specification, Effect Size, and Reach to Estimate and Compare the Population Impact of Two PTSD
Preventive Interventions,” Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological Processes 72, no. 4 (December 2009):
346–59, doi:10.1521/psyc.2009.72.4.346.
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Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness program with other existing
efforts. These additional resilience-building activities, such as yoga,
nutrition classes, and financial planning courses, addressed topics across
the five dimensions of strength—physical, emotional, family, social, and
spiritual—identified by the Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness
program. Dragoon Total Fitness brought these disparate programs
together by providing resources and establishing specific expectations.
Leaders in the regiment were provided with a dedicated block of
time for Comprehensive Soldier and Family Fitness resilience training.
Every tenth morning a physical fitness period was set aside for resilience
training—90 minutes every other week—to build resilience skills
without adding to the already packed calendar of events. To help junior
leaders meet the requirement to complete both Master Resiliency
Training and at least one supplemental resilience activity per month, a
user-friendly manual was developed. The Dragoon Total Fitness Guide
provided background information on the Comprehensive Soldier and
Family Fitness program; a schedule of installation resilience-building
activities; and an overview of events, contact information, and required
equipment; as well as recommendations and milestones for conducting
the Dragoon Total Fitness program over a year. Leaders could use the
guide to select specific resilience activities for their units and their
understanding of their soldiers.
As is the case with all things, leader priority and involvement were
critical to the program’s success. Leaders were expected to participate.
From first-line supervisors to the regimental commander, classes and
additional resilience activities were not relegated to optional status; they
were regarded as places of duty.
Competing requirements for leaders’ time resulted in initial
reluctance to schedule the classes and ensure they were conducted with
detailed preparation and effort. Furthermore, the seemingly endless
requirements dictated by the Army regulation caused some leaders to
determine what they believed was important, often reporting completion
of some tasks regardless of the quality of completion.11 This reporting
style has been identified as a risk the Army takes when there are too
many requirements.12
Leaders who rejected the program often poorly selected their
resilience instructors. In fact, bad instructors were actually more
destructive to the program than not conducting training. Soldiers who
attended classes led by inadequate instructors were less likely to see the
benefits of the training, not inclined to attend additional training, nor
were they open to the positive potential of resilience training.
In conjunction with leader emphasis, tenacity played a key role in
increasing the unit’s engagement in resilience. Despite concerns from
some junior leaders, the commander retained resilience as a priority.
Timelines for resilience module training and completion of individual
soldiers’ training were tracked with the same importance as physical
fitness tests and marksmanship qualification records. Rather than simply
11 Headquarters, US Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Training and Leader Development,
Army Regulation 350-1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2014).
12 Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015).
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complete two or four classes, soldiers had to complete full modules
in accordance with a published and tracked standard. Recognizing
the 2nd Cavalry Regiment would deploy over the life of the program,
the modules accommodated the tour in Afghanistan. Although the
timeline incorporated the rigors of combat, the criticality of resilience—
particularly during the deployment—increased the emphasis on
completing the resilience training.
As more leaders experienced the training as it was intended, they
became more open to its potential, and the program became part of the
regimental culture. Jokes from soldiers on post indicated the program
was increasingly becoming a part of the fabric of the unit. Soldiers
were discussing training-related terminology across the post. From
admonishing each other to “hunt the good stuff” at the post exchange
and warning those causing “activating events” that might lead to confl ict,
the jokes indicated a common language was being established.

The Soldier’s Perspective

As part of the program initiative, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment
partnered with the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research during 2013
and 2014 to assess soldier perceptions of Dragoon Total Fitness. The
research team surveyed all of the regiment’s available soldiers—a total
of 2,181 soldiers—about leader support for the program. Overall, the
soldiers rated 28 percent of their company leaders as “enthusiastic”; 47
percent, “open to the idea”; 22 percent, “going through the motions”;
and 3 percent, “negative.” The more unit leaders were perceived as
enthusiastic or open to the idea of the Dragoon Total Fitness program,
the more likely soldiers were to report the training was useful. The
usefulness of the training was recognized by 63 percent of the soldiers
who rated their leaders as enthusiastic, 43 percent of the soldiers who
rated their leaders as open to the idea, 24 percent of the soldiers who
rated their leaders as going through the motions, and 17 percent of the
soldiers who rated their leaders as negative.
Furthermore, leader engagement in the following supportive
behaviors were directly linked to soldiers’ perceptions of leader
enthusiasm for the program: (1) attend the training activities, (2)
emphasize the importance of training skills, (3) refer to resilience skills
when talking with soldiers, and (4) encourage soldiers to use these
skills—for example, 62 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as
enthusiastic also reported that their leaders attended resilience training
activities, 35 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as open to
the idea also reported leader attendance, 21 percent of soldiers who
regarded their leaders as just going through the motions reported leader
attendance, and only 9 percent of soldiers who regarded their leaders as
negative also reported leader attendance. The same pattern held true for
the other supportive behaviors. In addition, the more leaders engaged
in these behaviors, the more soldiers reported using the skills they had
learned and that the training was useful. Most importantly, the more
leaders engaged in supportive behaviors, the better soldiers rated their
unit climate and their own mental health.
Notably, even after accounting for rank and generally strong
leadership skills in a series of multiple regression analyses, leadership
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behaviors that supported resilience training were still independently
associated with using resilience skills from the training, finding the
training useful, perceiving a positive unit climate, and reporting fewer
mental health symptoms such as traumatic stress, anxiety, and anger,
which means the focus on promoting resilience training adds value.
Additionally, these same models even significantly predicted unit climate
and many of the same mental health outcomes four months later.
Command support for resilience trainers has been associated
with more effective training in previous studies.13 To our knowledge,
however, this article is the first to introduce the direct link between
ratings of leader support for training and soldier perceptions of training.
While these results confirm what many leaders have long known about
the power of command support, the findings also offer direction for
improving the impact of resilience training on units by emphasizing the
role of leaders.

Strengthening Resilience

Training needs to be valuable and relevant. Resilience training
should be tested with strong study design, with military populations,
and with pertinent military problems and challenges in mind. Training
untested in the military context may mismatch the occupational
context and could distract from the Army’s established and well-vetted
program. Interventions based on civilian data may not necessarily work
with servicemembers.
In one case, for example, a well-established intervention involving
expressive writing was shown to be contraindicated for soldiers
following combat deployment. Specifically, soldiers with high levels
of combat experiences who were randomly assigned to the expressive
writing condition reported more anger months later than did those
assigned to the control condition.14 This study, while not yielding the
expected results, was valuable because it underscored the importance of
testing interventions in a military context using a randomized controlled
design. The research emphasized the need to understand the population
and the importance of this understanding for guiding decision-making
about appropriate implementation.
Training needs to be integrated and marketed as part of one
coherent program. Programs can integrate a range of topics, but ideally,
the end user needs to see how the components fit together. Sometimes,
perhaps as the result of misplaced enthusiasm, individuals approach
senior leaders with new material that has not yet been scientifically
validated. These well-intended individuals are typically passionate about
their work and their belief that the material is critically important for the
health and performance of servicemembers. But, ad-hoc programs lack
the appropriate research evidence to validate their expected benefits.
One way leaders can respond to these suggestions is to recommend
the individual partner with academic researchers who can help submit
research proposals for funding. The government has several mechanisms
13 Paul B. Lester et al., The Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program Evaluation, Report #3: Longitudinal
Analysis of the Impact of Master Resilience Training on Self-Reported Resilience and Psychological Health Data
(Arlington, VA: Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, Department of the Army, 2011).
14 Christopher Munsey, “Writing about Wounds,” Monitor on Psychology, October 2009, 58.
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to fund research studies, including ongoing broad agency announcements
that allow preproposals to be reviewed on a continuous basis.15 These
preproposals can be selected for a full proposal, independently reviewed,
and potentially recommended for funding. This process is vital to the
development of new and effective training.
New material can be valuable to refreshing training programs when
appropriately assessed through empirical study. Approved training also
needs to be integrated into the unit culture by reinforcing the concepts
over time. Embedding resilience skills in military tasks, and not just in
a classroom setting, should increase the degree skills will be routinely
practiced and supported by unit members and leaders.
Training needs to be scalable. Training that can only be
implemented by one or two experts or that requires excessive resources
will not lead to a sustainable program. Moreover, training must be
provided by carefully selected and sufficiently prepared trainers, even at
the unit level, who are well-suited to the task. Ongoing quality control
checks need to be conducted to make sure drift from the original
training content—a natural risk in providing decentralized training—is
avoided. Professional resilience trainers, such as the Army Resiliency
Directorate’s Performance Experts who are master’s and PhD level
trainers in mental skills, can also be used to reinforce unit training and
ensure optimal presentation.
Training needs to be supported by leaders at all levels. This
support can be maximized by explaining the program’s rationale,
scientific evidence, and the importance of leader engagement. Senior
leaders need to send an unequivocal message about the importance of
resilience training. Research evidence is critical because leaders need to
be able to distinguish between good ideas with enthusiastic support and
good ideas with an evidence base. They need to know the questions to
ask or reach out to experts to help evaluate proposed ideas.
Part of leader engagement involves creating policies and procedures
to ensure implementation, coordination, and resources, such as those
described in the analysis of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment’s Dragoon Total
Fitness program. Leader support does not have to be an amorphous
concept. As suggested by the 2nd Cavalry Regiment study, effective
leader support can consist of practical steps such as attending training,
emphasizing the importance of training, referring to the training content
when talking with soldiers, and encouraging soldiers to use the skills.
A review of the Army’s resilience training would not be complete
without also mentioning the concern that the program is an unnecessary
burden on soldiers and leaders. In reality, training is ubiquitous across
the Army, and the topics, breadth, and results of such training should
be questioned to maintain the learning orientation of the organization.
Indeed, some of the analysis provided here regarding the importance of
leader support applies to all training implementation. Still, the data are
specific to resilience training perceptions and suggest leaders at all levels
can engage in behaviors that promote unit-based resilience programs,
enhance the efficacy of the training itself, and serve as force multipliers.
15 For information on submitting broad agency announcements and requests for proposals,
see “How to Submit a Research Proposal,” US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command,
http://www.usamraa.army.mil/pages/baa_paa/baaproposal.htm (accessed April 5, 2017).
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Future efforts should examine ways to select training modules that
are a good fit for leaders’ units. Combining a unit resilience profi le with
recommendations for targeted training modules would offer a more
systematic approach to matching training with particular units. In this
way, scores on various resilience factors, such as those identified by the
RAND overview, could be used to align units with specific training and
ultimately to help units operate more effectively in decentralized and
complex environments.
Prioritizing resilience training among the myriad requirements
leaders face requires careful balance in this era of perpetual confl ict.
Obviously, soldiers need practice in tactics, units need to gain confidence
working together as a team, and leaders need experience with high-stress
decision-making. Each of these requirements, coupled with individual
deployment preparations, means finding time for “additional” training
will be nearly impossible. Yet, if resilience training is understood to be
a valuable investment, then it will not be so easily dismissed. In fact,
appropriately implemented resilience training can make soldiers better
at tactics, teamwork, and critical decision-making, all essential elements
of the human dimensions concept, and more importantly, keys to success
in training and on the battlefield.
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